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This paper examines information sharing between governments in an optimal taxation 
framework. We present a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital income 
taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange. The model 
reproduces the conclusion of the previous literature that integration of international capital 
markets may lead to the under-provision of publicly provided goods. However, contrary to the 
existing literature under-provision occurs because of inefficiently coordinated expectations. 
We show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of public good 
provision and complete and voluntary information exchange between national tax authorities. 
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The enforcement of an eﬀective taxation of savings income has been a long-standing
issue both in policy and in academic debates. In particular, residence-based taxation
of capital income – the taxation of a country’s residents regardless of the income’s
source – has often been advocated. A potential drawback of this form of taxation, how-
ever, is that the tax can be easily evaded if the residence country is unable to monitor
the investor’s foreign interest income. This scenario has relevance in the absence of in-
ternational information-exchange agreements between countries. Without information
exchange, source-based forms of taxation constitute the relevant tax types from the
perspective of any outside investor. Since most countries abstain from levying taxes at
the income’s source there is a widespread belief that interest income may completely
escape taxation (Keen 1993). It is thus not surprising that the taxation of savings
income on a residence basis continues to be a frequently advocated tax principle in
policy debates, although previous work on international taxation concludes that it will
most probably not be in the national self-interest to report information to foreign tax
authorities (as, e.g., Tanzi 1995).
Interestingly, irrespective of the perceived mistrust in the ability of tax authorities
to sustain a system of information exchange between sovereign countries, prominent
recent policy recommendations as the OECD (2002) initiative and the proposal of the
European Commission (2001) focus on such a system. At least the European proposal
seems to receive much more support among member states than previously thought. On
the council meeting in January 2003 European governments have agreed to exchange
information about interest incomes of non-resident investors with other member states.
The agreement explicitly introduces residence-based taxation of savings after almost
13 years of diplomatic wrangling on the savings-tax issue.
The OECD initiative and the European agreements are supported by previous lit-
erature on capital-tax competition. It is a standard result in this literature that the
adverse eﬀects of decentralized decision-making by governments on welfare could be
neutralized if the residence principle were applicable for the taxation of international
capital income (Razin and Sadka 1991, Bucovetsky and Wilson 1991).1 However, this
1The intuition is that the residence based capital tax is the only tax that allows to control the
savings of residents. It is for this reason that distortions caused by decentralized tax setting in the in
the ‘basic tax competition model’ (cf. Wilson 1999) introduced by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)
can directly be attributed to the non-existence of a tax on world wide capital income of residents.
1previous work does not formally address the question how governments can possibly
obtain the information required to monitor the worldwide capital income of residents.
The correspondence between the ﬁndings and recommendations of theoretical re-
search and the success of actual tax agreements, thus, is by no means obvious. The
crucial question is whether it is in the self-interest of the national tax authorities to
truthfully report the information necessary to establish a residence-based system of
capital taxation. The results provide an answer to the question about the potential
success of the above-mentioned information-exchange treaties, which goes to the heart
of the discussion about the residence principle.
Qualitatively there may be two reasons to withhold information. Both arguments
rely on the eﬀect that withholding information reduces the tax burden placed on the
interest income of savers, which causes an inﬂow of ﬁnancial capital. According to the
ﬁrst argument, this inﬂow may cause an outward shift of the production possibility
frontier of a country and it may create favorable tax-base eﬀects. Countries will then
choose to withhold information to attract ﬁnancial capital. This observation would
lead to the conclusion that the incentives of individual countries do not coincide with
collective rationality, since the latter calls for information exchange to make residence-
based capital income taxation sustainable. As a consequence, the ﬁrst argument sug-
gests that information-exchange treaties are not credible without the establishment of
a supra-national agency that enforces contracts to overcome the Prisoners’ Dilemma in
information policy. The second potential reason for the withholding of information is
based on a co-ordination failure between the countries. This case belongs to a class of
economic environments where multiple equilibria exist and policy faces an equilibrium-
selection problem. In the second scenario information exchange is an equilibrium, but
countries may be stuck in the no-information equilibrium because of ineﬃciently co-
ordinated expectations. Countries may perceive a conﬂict between individual rationality
and collective rationality in the second case. In contrast to the ﬁrst argument, however,
countries can co-ordinate their expectations on a diﬀerent equilibrium during negotia-
tions. Eﬃcient co-ordination can explain the empirical observation that fully sovereign
countries choose to sign tax treaties.
The relevant scenario can, however, not be deduced from empirical observations
alone. We rather have to identify the basic economic mechanism that underlies tax
treaties. Some preceding papers analyzed the problem of information exchange in dif-
For a discussion see Eggert and Hauﬂer (1999).
2ferent contexts. Bacchetta and Espinosa (1995, 2000) analyze the issue in an economy
with source taxes on real capital and exogenously given tax rates in a static (1995)
and a repeated game (2000). Information withholding attracts real capital and thereby
increases both, total production and tax revenues of the economy. Hence, their main
conclusion is that information exchange cannot be supported as an equilibrium of the
static game. However, in the repeated game they characterize punishment strategies and
reciprocity norms that are suﬃcient to guarantee the exchange of information. Eggert
and Kolmar (2002) identify an economic environment where information withholding
does neither create direct nor tax-base eﬀects. However, if the size of the ﬁnancial sector
is of importance for the production potential of an economy, information withholding
may become rational again. In the same spirit, Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) focus on
the existence of bank proﬁts as a possible explanation for why countries may have an
incentive to withhold information. Bank proﬁts depend on the quantity of investments
in a given country, hence, tax authorities have an incentive to withhold information.
In a repeated version of the game the authors can show, however, that information
exchange can be sustained as an equilibrium if the discount factor is suﬃciently small.
What is missing in the discussion so far is the explicit consideration of diﬀerent
regimes for the taxation of ﬁnancial capital. This paper attempts to close this gap by
explicitly considering diﬀerent tax regimes on ﬁnancial capital. Accordingly we analyze
two central questions. First, what are the economic eﬀects of information policies in
diﬀerent tax regimes? And, second, if the participation in an agreement on information
exchange were voluntary, would the agreement be undermined by countries which are
linked through perfect capital mobility?
Our main results are as follows. We show that the ﬁscal authorities cannot generate
tax revenues from source-based taxes on savings in the Nash equilibrium if capital is
perfectly mobile. It is this case which underlies most of the previous work that fore-
cast the ineﬃciency of decentralized tax setting. It is one of the major insights of the
paper that this eﬀect paves the way for the voluntary exchange of information. Coun-
tries choose to exchange information on the income of non-residents exactly because
they perceive the tax base of any capital tax to be inﬁnite elastic in the absence of
information-exchange agreements. This is what we call the tax-competition paradox:
capital-market integration eliminates a Prisoners’ Dilemma in which tax agreements
are not an equilibrium exactly because countries are confronted with perfect capital-
market integration. As a consequence, governments can eﬀectively use a residence tax,
and the presence of residence-based capital-income taxation ensures that decentralized
3decision-making by governments is eﬃcient. However, we also show that an equilibrium
with less desirable welfare properties coexists. In this equilibrium the tax authorities
co-ordinated expectations ineﬃciently choose not to exchange information with foreign
tax authorities.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model before we derive the
basic results concerning information exchange and the tax structures in Sections 3
and 4. Section 5 summarizes.
2 The model with portfolio-capital ﬂows
We consider a version of the ‘basic’ tax-competition model (cf. Wilson 1999) introduced
by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) with two identical countries, i = 1,2. Countries are
linked through perfect capital mobility and are assumed to be small in the sense that
each takes the international price for capital as given. Each country is inhabited by a
representative individual and ﬁrms in both countries produce a homogeneous good. We
adapt the model for the taxation of ﬁnancial capital and the strategic use of information
exchange in an economic environment where individuals choose their savings and labor
supply.
As in Bacchetta and Espinosa (1995, 2000) we will assume that the issue of in-
formation exchange is more fundamental than a decision about tax rates, essentially
because it is included in tax treaties. A decision about an information policy basically
determines whether a residence-based tax is available or not, but the information pol-
icy does not prevent countries from choosing their tax rates in accordance with speciﬁc
ﬁscal needs. In detail, we consider the following game structure that will be explained
in the following:
//
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Governments
non-cooperatively and






tax rates on wage and capital
income.
Period 1: Individuals make a
savings decision.
Period 2: Individuals choose
labor supply, ﬁrms produce
and tax revenue is spent.
Governments and institutions. Even in a two-country economy the ﬂows of real
and ﬁnancial capital induce a complicated net of transactions. This net is represented
in Figure 1. The arrows indicate the ﬂows of ﬁnancial capital investments and the
knots the bases for diﬀerent taxes. In line with most of the literature on capital tax
4competition we assume that individuals in country, say, i can invest there savings in the
ﬁnancial sector either at home or abroad (see, among others, Wildasin 1988, Keen and
Marchand 1997, Brueckner 2000). Financial intermediaries (‘banks’) in both countries
may invest in the rest of the world (row), at the same time individuals have limited
options for their worldwide ﬁnancial investment.2 The existence of an international
market for ﬁnancial capital then ensures that savings are allocated in the country where
the after-tax rate of return is highest, implying equalization of lending and borrowing
interest rates worldwide (as in, for example, Wildasin 1988, Keen and Marchand 1997,
p. 231 and p. 36, respectively).
residence-based
tax on savings
_ _ Individuals in i

 (( Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
asymmetric








_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ • • _ _ _ _ _ _ _ withholding
taxes on savings
_ _ _ _ _ _
source-based
tax on savings
_ _ _ _ _ _ • • source-based
tax on savings
_ _ _ _ _ _
row oo // Financial Sector i //

,, Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
international






_ _ _ _ _ • • source-based tax
on real capital
_ _ _ _ _
Firms in i Firms in j
Figure 1: Institutional structure of capital taxation.
We assume that national tax authorities can only force banks residing within the
country to report truthfully the amount of savings invested, but not banks abroad.
Hence, the government has to rely on the information given by tax authorities in the
competing country to enforce the residence-based tax on worldwide capital income. If
this information is incomplete, capital income is composed of declared and taxed income
and undeclared and untaxed income. We adopt the convention used in Bacchetta and
Espinosa (1995), Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) and assume that each tax authority
chooses the fraction λ of non-residents’ savings it reports to the tax authority in the
country where the investor resides. In order to make the model analytically tractable
2This assumption is made for analytical convenience and without relevance for the results. It has
some empirical plausibility though. The Deutsche Bundesbank (1994) estimated that the announce-
ment of a 10% withholding in Germany tax caused a capital outﬂow of 99.5 bill. DM in 1989. The
by far largest part of it was channeled through aﬃliates of German banks located in Luxembourg.
5we assume that information is either completely exchanged or not exchanged at all.
Alternative systems of income taxation Previous literature on capital-tax com-
petition has analyzed the interaction of a wage tax with the source-based tax on real
capital. Razin and Sadka (1991) demonstrate that a tax authority in a small open econ-
omy chooses not to tax real capital investment of ﬁrms on a source basis conditional to
the presence of a positive level of wage taxation. The intuition for this result is based on
the following arguments. The source tax on real capital distorts the production decision
of ﬁrms. The wage tax, in contrast, distorts the individual’s labor-leisure choice. It fol-
lows then from an application of the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) production-eﬃciency
theorem that the production tax will not be used by the government because this tax
ultimately falls on wage income and, additionally, causes a production distortion. The
latter can be avoided by directly taxing wage income. In order to have a lean set of
tax instruments, we will make use of the theorem and exclude a source tax on produc-
tive capital from the set of instruments in the following. The absence of source-based
taxes on real capital allows it to use the terms ‘savings’ and ‘(ﬁnancial) investments’ as
synonyms throughout the analysis, both referring to the ﬁnancial side of the economy.
In our setting each tax authority has three diﬀerent tax instruments at its disposal
(Figure 1). All taxes are in the interval [0,1]. Take country i as an example. First, it can
choose the rate tw
i at which it taxes wage income wi li, where wi denotes the wage rate
and li is labor supply. Second, it can choose to tax the capital income of residents at rate
tr
i. Tax revenues, however, depend on the status of information exchange by the other
country. Residence-based capital taxation can be implemented if the foreign country




where R is the world return to capital and si
i,s
j
i denotes the amount of savings that




information is not exchanged then tr
i will turn out to be a tax on the income of i-
residents generated in country i alone. Third, the government may tax capital income
generated at home on a source basis, ts
i.
The discrimination between residents and non-residents under source-based forms
of taxation has been prominent in policy debates, as the OECD (1998) guidelines
demonstrate. The economic consequences of a preferential tax treatment are in the
center of recent work by Keen (2001) and Janeba and Smart (2003), and we also allow
for preferential tax treatment in this paper. The source tax ts
i we consider can take
two forms, dependent on the parameter φ, which is the rate at which countries include
6their residents’ interest income in the source-tax base. The following table summarizes
the link between tax rates and tax bases:
wage tax residence-based tax source-based tax withholding tax




i at φ = 1 ts
i at φ = 0
tax base wi li R(si










We use the standard convention – and the notation used in Figure 1 – that a
source-based tax is a tax levied in the country of the income’s source independent of
the investor’s residency. A tax on investment by foreigners is called a withholding tax.
With this terminology we can distinguish between two cases. In the ﬁrst case, φ = 1,
the government treats resident and foreign investors equal. This source-tax regime is
analyzed in Section 3. In the second case, φ = 0, country i exempts residents’ interest
income generated at home from the tax base. Hence, if φ = 0, ts
i speciﬁes a withholding
tax on the capital income generated at home by foreign residents. We discuss this case
in Section 4.
Given the taxes introduced above, the net wage a resident in country i obtains for




i := R(1 − tr
i − ts
i φ) and ρ
j







j is the eﬀective tax paid by residents of country i on the
capital income generated in country i and country j, respectively. Thus, ρi
i is the net
of tax interest rate residents of country i obtain for investments in country i and ρ
j
i
is the net return which residents of country i receive from investments in country j.
With this notation, the system of taxation of capital income established in country i is
described by a vector {tw
i ,tr
i,ts
i,λj,φ}, where the ﬁrst three components are chosen by
the country itself, whereas the fourth component is the level of information exchange
chosen by country j.
2.1 The market equilibrium under alternative tax systems
We solve the game by backward induction, starting determining the market equilibrium
at Stage 3.
7Firms. Production takes place under conditions of perfect competition with a





, which relates output of the con-
sumption good to the level of (real) capital investment, ki, and the amount of labor
employed, ld






i − Rki = 0, where R de-
notes the (exogenous) world interest rate and wi is the national (gross) wage rate. The











Households. The representative household in, say, country i maximizes lifetime util-
ity subject to both period’s budget constraints. The utility function is ν (ci1,ci2,li) +
u(gi). It is assumed to be well-behaved and, for analytical convenience, separable be-
tween consumption and labor, ci1,ci2,li, and the national public good, gi. Let us denote
by ei an endowment that individuals obtain at the beginning of the ﬁrst period.3 The
endowment can either be consumed, ci1, or saved, si. The household can either save
at home, si
i, or abroad, s
j
i, si = si
i + s
j
i. The budget constraint in the ﬁrst period is




In the second period the household chooses labor supply, li, and receives savings
income plus the principal. Residents in country i earn a net return of ρi
i for every unit
saved at home, and they earn a net return of ρ
j
i for every unit saved abroad. The second-
period budget constraint is ci2 = ωili + (1 + ρi
i)si




i. In subsequent analysis
we follow Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991, pp. 340-341) assuming that the cross-price
derivatives of compensated factor supply functions are negative.4
Using the budget constraints in the direct utility function gives the utility function









i, ωili + (1 + ρi
i)si







Denoting by subscripts partial derivatives, the ﬁrst-order conditions for a utility maxi-
mum are νc1/νc2 ≥ 1+ρi
i, νc1/νc2 ≥ 1+ρ
j
i and νli/νc1 = −ωi. A comparison of the ﬁrst
and second condition deﬁnes the arbitrage condition between investment at home and
3To make the tax problem interesting we assume that the endowment cannot be taxed. It is
assumed to be suﬃciently large to avoid that individuals take out loans in the ﬁrst period. The
present modelling of the individual’s problem is adapted from Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991).
4Hence, ∂lc/∂ρ < 0 and ∂sc/∂ω < 0, where a superscript c denotes compensated functions. The
assumption implies that wage and residence taxes on capital income are positive in the optimum.
See King (1980) for a discussion of the role of compensated demand elasticities of leisure and
second-period consumption for the optimum savings tax in a related framework.
8investment abroad. Inspection of the ﬁrst-order conditions shows that the household
will not invest at home as long as ρi
i < ρ
j
i. Let us assume that individuals prefer to save
at home in case of indiﬀerence. We summarize the arbitrage opportunities at a given
vector of after-tax prices as follows:
Lemma 1. (a) If ρi
i ≥ ρ
j
i ⇒ si = si
i ∧ s
j
i = 0. (b) If ρi
i < ρ
j




It can be seen from Lemma 1 that there can be discrete jumps in the allocation of














j ,λj,φ}, we can deﬁne an equilibrium as a pair of
prices {wi,wj} which is compatible with proﬁt and utility maximization and simul-
taneously fulﬁlls the market-clearing conditions for national labor markets, ld
i = li
and ld
j = lj. Inserting the equilibrium values of ci1, ci2, li into the utility function yields






j ,λj,φ) := maxci1,ci2,li ν (ci1,ci2,li).5
Tax authorities. For a given information policy {λi,λj} every national authority















as given the tax policy of the other country. A Nash equilibrium at Stage 2 is a ﬁxed
point in tax policies. Tax revenues are used to ﬁnance the public good. For simplicity
we assume that the quantity of the public good, gi, is equal to the tax revenues:
gi = tw
i wi li + (ts























In line with the literature on optimal taxation we assume that the tax problem is convex
(Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980). We then have to characterize the equilibrium tax policy
with associated welfare levels for every realization of information policies {λi,λj} ∈
{{1,1},{0,1},{1,0},{0,0}} for both, φ = 1 and φ = 0. In the following we denote
by Wi(λi,λj) the equilibrium levels of welfare given the equilibrium at Stage 2 for either
5We omit R in the domain of the indirect utility function for simplicity because it is no choice
variable of the tax authorities. The equilibrium wage rates do not occur in the indirect utility
function because they are functions of the government instruments.
6Note that d might indicate discrete jumps for changes in information and taxes from Lemma 1.
9φ = 1 or φ = 0. Finally, both countries non-cooperatively maximize their welfare levels
Wi(λi,λj) taking as given the choice of information exchange by the other country. A
Nash equilibrium of the game at Stage 1 is a ﬁxed point in the information parameters.7
3 Source taxation
3.1 Tax policies
We will start with an analysis of the case where countries do not discriminate between
residents and non-residents in tax matters. This corresponds to the non-preferential
tax regime that underlies the OECD (1998) guidelines, in which governments do not
exempt residents from source-based taxation, φ = 1. Using (1), Lemma 1 reads:





≥ (1 − λj)tr
i + ts




< (1 − λj)tr
i + ts




The inequality in Lemma 2 measures the tax diﬀerential an individual residing in
country i faces when making his investment decision. We may now characterize the
tax strategies of the governments in each country in three diﬀerent cases: ﬁrst, both
governments simultaneously exchange information; second, both governments do not
exchange information, and, third, exactly one country exchanges information.
Tax rates with information exchange. In the case of full information exchange
the countries will not use the source tax but rely on both, the wage and residence tax.
Intuitively, the second-best eﬃcient allocation can be implemented by the use of wage-
and residence taxes alone. There is no need for a source tax in this case.
In order to make the intuition precise we start with the source taxes ﬁrst and
demonstrate that ts
i = ts
j = 0 is the only candidate for an equilibrium. In order to do
so assume on the contrary that source-based capital taxes are non-zero in at least one
country for arbitrary rates of the wage tax and the residence-based capital income tax.
For example it follows from λj = 1 that the government in country i can implement a
residence-based tax on i-residents, which cannot be circumvented and hence does not
enter the arbitrage condition of the individual residing in i (see Lemma 2). However, the
7It is well known that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies need not exist if the strategy space
is not continuous. As we will see this problem does not occur in the present model.
10source tax on capital income taxation is relevant for the decision of individuals where
to invest. Start by assuming that country i imposes a slightly higher source-based tax
than country j. It will only be able to collect the wage tax and the residence-based
tax as all ﬁnancial investment will be in country j. The government in country i can
reduce ts
i to attract savings. Tax arbitrage by investors implies that the reduction of ts
i





j we get an inﬂow of savings from i-residents. If ts
j = 0, the tax cut does not
generate a tax-base eﬀect. However, if tj
s > 0 there exists a positive tax-base eﬀect. On
the other hand, the individual decision is still unchanged because there is no change in




j > 0 and country i further reduces ts
i, we get a second-order loss of tax rev-
enues collected from residents and an additional second-order eﬀect because of the
change in relative prices faced by residents. However, these second-order eﬀects are
over-compensated by the ﬁrst-order eﬀect resulting from the additional tax revenues
from the reallocation of investments country j-residents previously invested abroad.8
Given that ts
i = ts




















































































Take a pair {tr
i,tw
i } such that both conditions are fulﬁlled. At that point we know
that Rsi dWi/dtw
i − wi li dWi/dtr




























































j − ,  > 0,  → 0. The policy has two eﬀects. First, the direct eﬀect of a tax cut on
residents’ utility is Rsi
i∂ν/∂ci2 > 0. Second, the loss of tax revenue from the source tax is equal to
−Rsi





i. Fourth, tax revenues increase because a j-resident re-allocates capital
to country i at ts
i < ts
j, which implies an increase in tax revenues that is equal to ts
iRsi
j. This
discrete change over-compensates the marginal changes of eﬀects two and three. Hence, country i
chooses ts
i < ts
j as long as ts
j > 0. At ts
j = 0 it follows immediately that ∂Wi/∂ts
i = 0 since a tax
increase would immediately and completely crowd out savings.
11Using the Slutsky equation we ﬁnd from (4) that 0 < tr
i/tw
i < ∞ under the assumption
that the cross-price derivatives of compensated factor supply functions are negative.
We may then summarize the results in the case of full information exchange:
Result 1. There exists a unique equilibrium of the subgame at Stage 2 for λi = λj = 1
that can be characterized as follows: ts
i = ts
j = 0, and the governments in both countries
use wage and residence-based capital taxation.
The observation that neither the residence-based capital tax nor the wage tax do
distort the international investment decision of savers has an interesting normative
implication:
Corollary 1. (Razin and Sadka 1991, Bucovetsky and Wilson 1991) The Nash equi-
librium with full exchange of information is globally eﬃcient given the available taxes.
A combined eﬀort to raise tax rates in all countries will not increase welfare.




















j at λi = λj = 1. The intuition for the ﬁnding is that
the place of investment is irrelevant for the tax payments when residence-based capital
taxation can be implemented by governments. Since the source-based capital-income
tax is zero already, the incentives of governments to strategically choose taxes to at-
tract capital are eliminated. There exists no externality between both countries that
destroys second-best eﬃciency.
Tax rates without information exchange. We demonstrate that both, residence
and source taxes are equal to zero if both countries withhold information. Hence, coun-
tries exclusively rely on the wage tax to ﬁnance the public good. This ﬁnding results
from the perfect integration of capital markets where individuals can and will use ar-
bitrage opportunities due to tax diﬀerentials if they exist. Hence, any positive source
or residence tax – which is equal to a selective tax on savings by residents at home
in the case without information exchange – in one country will create the incentive in
the other country to undercut this tax rate in order to attract a discrete quantity of
savings, thereby increasing tax revenues. Even a home-bias in the sense that for equal
net-interest rates individuals prefer to invest at home does not change this logic because
the individuals are ultimately motivated by their monetary income.
12If all capital taxes are equal to zero, wage taxation alone has to be used to fulﬁll
the budget constraint (2) and the ﬁrst-order condition for tw
i (3). The latter constraint
can be rewritten to obtain
tw
i = li (1/(wi ∂li/∂wi) − (∂ν/∂ci2)/(∂u/∂gi)). (5)
Result 2. There exists a unique equilibrium of the subgame at Stage 2 for λi = λj = 0




j = 0, and governments use only
wage taxation to fulﬁll the budget constraint (2).
The formal proof of this and the following results is tedious and is therefore relegated
to the Appendix. The result reﬂects the frequently perceived fear that capital tax-
competition undermines the ability to raise tax revenue from capital income taxation.
The downward competition in taxes leads to a lower level of tax revenue and public-
good provision, compared to a situation in which tax competition is absent.
Tax rates with asymmetric information exchange. If information is asym-
metrically exchanged we get a combination of the two previous cases. If λi = 0,λj = 1
(λi = 1, λj = 0) only country i (j) can eﬀectively use its residence-based capital tax. As
a consequence, it will use only wage and residence taxes. It is thereby able to implement
the second-best optimum. Country j, however, will not be able to use its source tax
because the use of this tax would drive all savings out of its country. As a consequence,
country i would have a ‘free lunch’ by taxing these foreign savings.
Result 3. There exists a unique equilibrium of the subgame at Stage 2 for λi = 0, λj =
1 that can be characterized as follows: ts
i = ts
j = tr
j = 0. The tax authority in country j
only uses wage taxation and the tax authority in country i uses both, residence and wage
taxation to fulﬁll the budget constraint in (2). The tax rates are characterized by (5)
and (4).
3.2 Information policies
Let us denote by Wi(λi,λj) the welfare level in country i given information poli-
cies {λi,λj}, and, analogously, denote by Wj(λj,λi) the welfare level in country j.
The small-country assumption separates both countries’ labor markets as can be seen
from the ﬁrst-order conditions of ﬁrms above. Results 1-3 then imply that
Wi(1,1) = Wi(0,1) and Wi(1,0) = Wi(0,0), (6)
13because the equilibrium tax rates in both inequalities are the same for all those taxes
with positive tax rates. The ﬁrst equality results from a comparison of Result 1 and
Result 3 for country i, whereas the second equality stems from a comparison of Result 2
and Result 3. The key to understand the equation on the l.h.s. of (6) is that even if
country i stops reporting information and thereby making it more attractive for a
j-resident to investment in country i, it is indiﬀerent because it will not collect tax
revenues from the additional investment. The main explanation for the equation on the
r.h.s. of (6) is that information exchange by country i does help to eﬀectively implement
residence-based taxation in country j. However, this has no eﬀect on welfare in country i
since the tax bases of capital taxes are zero if the government in country i chooses to
tax capital.
We can now derive the equilibrium strategies at Stage 1. The maximization problem
of country i is maxλi Wi(λi,λj). By the same token, maxλj Wj(λj,λi) is the maximiza-
tion problem of country j. A Nash equilibrium is a ﬁxed point {λN
i ,λN
j }. Assume
that λj = 1. Country i compares Wi(1,1) with Wi(0,1). It follows from (6) that λi = 1
is a best response to λj = 1 and vice versa. On the other hand, let λj be equal to 0.
Country i has the choice between Wi(1,0) and Wi(0,0). Inspection of the equation on
the r.h.s. of (6) shows that λi = 0 is a best response to λj = 0 and vice versa.
Result 4. With a source tax on capital full information exchange as well as no infor-
mation exchange are Nash equilibria between the countries.
We will interpret the implications of Result 4 after the analysis of withholding
taxation in the next section.
4 Withholding taxation
4.1 Tax policies
In the preferential-tax regime we analyze in this section each tax authority exempts
its own residents from source-based taxation and implements a withholding tax on
foreigners, φ = 0. Then, the arbitrage condition given in Lemma 1 simpliﬁes as follows:





≥ (1 − λj)tr




< (1 − λj)tr
i ⇒ s
j
i = si ∧ si
i = 0.
14As in the preceding section we analyze the equilibrium tax policies for diﬀerent
information scenarios in turn.
Tax rates with information exchange. If information is exchanged, Lemma 3
implies that si = si
i if and only if ts
j ≥ 0, and sj = s
j
j if and only if ts
i ≥ 0. Hence,
the tax revenues from the withholding tax are always equal to zero; either the tax
rate or the tax base is equal to zero because of an inﬁnitely high elasticity of savings.
Diﬀerent to the case analyzed in the last section, however, the exemption of residents
from the source tax gives rise to multiple equilibria. Every pair of tax rates {ts
i,ts
j} is
an equilibrium because residents cannot avoid the residence tax and therefore prefer
to invest at home. The foreign source-tax rate can never inﬂuence this decision. As
a consequence, both countries maximize welfare by the choice of wage and residence
taxes. The structure of the maximization problems is identical to the one with a zero
source tax, and (4) characterizes the optimum.
Result 5. Equilibria of the subgame at Stage 2 for λi = λj = 1 exist and can be char-
acterized as follows: countries choose an arbitrary withholding-tax rate whose revenues
are equal to zero, and they set wage and residence taxes according to (4).
Tax rates without information exchange. If both countries do not exchange
information, λi = λj = 0, individuals have the choice between the residence tax when
investing at home and the withholding tax when investing abroad. In such a situation,
the tax revenues from capital taxation must be equal to zero because otherwise at least
one country would have an incentive to selectively attract at least one tax base by
slightly undercutting the other country’s tax rate.
Result 6. Equilibria of the subgame at Stage 2 for λi = λj = 0 exist and can be
characterized as follows. (1) Tax revenues from capital taxes are always equal to zero.
(2) Either the residence-tax rates are equal to zero and the source tax rates are arbitrary,
the source-tax rates are equal to zero and the residence-tax rates are arbitrary, or one
country chooses both taxes to be equal to zero and the other country chooses arbitrary
residence- and withholding-tax rates. Both countries use the wage tax according to (5).
The multiplicity of equilibria is again a consequence of the selective nature of the
withholding tax. In the case of zero residence taxes, for example, all savings are invested
in the home countries. Hence, every possible withholding tax is compatible with this
allocation of savings because their tax base is always equal to zero. By the same token,
15if both withholding taxes are equal to zero, all savings are invested abroad, and the
residence taxes are either zero or have a zero tax base. The third tax-rate scenario
also has an intuitive explanation: if one country has attracted all savings, this country
has to set both capital taxes equal to zero in order not to be undercut by the other
country. If it sets the tax rates to zero, however, every source-tax rate and every positive
residence-tax rate by the other country is compatible with this allocation of savings, As
a consequence, information exchange turns out to be crucial for the eﬀective taxation
of capital. Without information exchange the countries cannot place part of the tax
burden on capital.
Tax rates with asymmetric information exchange. We ﬁnally analyze the case
where λi = 0 and λj = 1. The economic intuition is similar to the one given for the
previous cases and we therefore restrict attention to present the result.
Result 7. Equilibria of the subgame at Stage 2 for λi = λj = 0 exist and can be
characterized as follows. (1) Tax revenues from the withholding tax in both countries
and from the residence tax in country j are always equal to zero. (2) The residence-
tax rate is equal to zero in j and the source tax rates are arbitrary. The wage tax for
country j is obtained from (5), whereas the wage and residence tax rates for country i
are given by (4).
4.2 Information policies
As before, the exogenous interest factor separates both countries’ labor markets. This
implies that we ﬁnd the same structure as in Section 3.2 when comparing the welfare
levels of diﬀerent information policies,
Wi(1,1) = Wi(0,1) and Wi(1,0) = Wi(0,0). (7)
The intuition for (7) is that the countries can only collect tax revenues from capital
taxation if the other country provides information about foreign investments. Without
this information tax revenues from capital income taxation are necessarily equal to
zero despite the fact that capital can be taxed at source since either the tax rate or
the tax base is zero. For this reason the increase of ﬁnancial investment by foreigners
that results from information withholding is irrelevant for the government in country i.
Hence, we get a result similar to Section 3.2.
16Result 8. With a withholding tax on foreign capital, full information exchange as well
as no information exchange are Nash equilibria between the countries.
What are the implications of Results 4 and 8? The ﬁrst conclusion is that the
withholding of information is in fact a rational strategy for the countries given that
countries expect that the other withhold information too. This ﬁnding replicates the
view of most previous analysis on capital tax competition that decentralized tax setting
of ﬁscal authorities leads to an underprovision of public goods. However, the economic
mechanisms that generate this result are diﬀerent because here results are caused by a
coordination-failure between countries. The expectation that taxes are set ineﬃciently
can turn out to be self-fulﬁlling. However, eﬃciency is a viable opportunity if countries
manage to coordinate their expectations on the information-exchange equilibrium. This
equilibrium exists because of the perfect integration of capital markets with the implied
elimination of positive revenues from source or withholding taxes.9
In a small, open economy, the withholding of information may be of interest for
a country if it can generate additional tax revenues from the use of source or with-
holding taxes. Perfectly integrated markets, however, eliminate this strategic incentive
by driving taxes levied at the income’s source to zero. To put it diﬀerently, the worst
case of tax competition paves the way for information exchange and thereby eﬃciency
of decentralized tax setting. Competition in tax rates credibly ties the hands of ﬁscal
authorities so that they have no incentive to engage in information competition. We
call this eﬀect the tax-competition paradox. In the light of this ﬁnding, the best way
to achieve eﬃcient taxation of capital income is to deepen international capital-market
integration.
9In Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) diﬀerences in population size are essential for the
structure of results because the diﬀerence determines the ability of ﬁscal policy to manipulate the
world interest rate. This paper assumed countries of equal size in order to simplify the exposition.
Our results extend to a situation with countries that diﬀer in population size as long as one country
does not become inﬁnitesimal small. The argument is that the results we obtain are driven by the
discrete changes in tax revenues resulting from marginal changes in tax rates. Competition will
eliminate the possibility to generate tax revenues from any source-based tax on ﬁnancial capital as
long as such discrete eﬀects are present.
175 Conclusions
Perfect capital mobility has been frequently seen as a source for economic growth, but,
at the same time, also as a major threat to ﬁscal authorities. The results of this paper
suggest that under speciﬁc circumstances the globalization of tax bases as such may
not be as harmful for countries as previously thought. Exactly when capital mobility is
perfect there exists an equilibrium with eﬃcient decentralized decision-making. Com-
petition eliminates the incentives to withhold information because it eliminates all the
taxes that are potential candidates for information-induced tax-base eﬀects. Hence, it
is not the presence of perfect capital mobility that causes an ineﬃciency of decentral-
ized decision-making by governments. This is what we have labeled the tax-competition
paradox in the introduction.
A short recapitulation of our main results reveals the basic mechanisms. (i) First,
both, source-based taxation and withholding taxation of ﬁnancial capital are identical
with respect to their equilibrium welfare levels irrespective of the fact that their tax
bases diﬀer. The intuition is that the tax elasticity of ﬁnancial capital is large enough to
drive revenues from source and withholding taxes to zero, reducing the set of eﬀectively
available tax instruments to wage and residence taxes. (ii) Second, tax competition is
not a Prisoners’ Dilemma in our model. Capital mobility ensures that governments are
unable to use the tax system to manipulate the allocation of tax bases. As a conse-
quence, governments do not treat information exchange as a cost when capital markets
are integrated.
The multiplicity of equilibria may be a key factor for the explanation of the current
tax treaties discussed in the introduction. It is undisputed that no-information ex-
change is in fact an equilibrium between countries, and in fact it is the equilibrium we
observe today between most countries. However, there also exist the treaties mentioned
in the introduction, which rely on the voluntary participation of sovereign countries
(Boadway 2001). If the underlying problem to be solved by these treatments is a Pris-
oners’ Dilemma, a theory-based prediction for their success must be very pessimistic.
However, voluntary participation in information-exchange treaties becomes viable if
multiple equilibria exist. It is then a question to coordinate expectations, and this may
be the primary function of the treaties.10
10A short remark on the theoretical literature concerning multiple equilibria is in order here.
Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) and Bacchetta and Espinosa (2000) show how punishment strategies
can be used to induce information exchange as an equilibrium in an inﬁnitely repeated game. The
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Proof of Result 2




j = 0, which implies that all savings are
invested in the country where the investor resides, si = si





j = 0, it follows immediately that there is no proﬁtable deviation for country i.
If country i increases its residence-tax rate their residents will reallocate their savings
to country j. Hence, total tax revenues remain zero, and the country is indiﬀerent. By
the same token, if country i increases its source-tax rate their residents will reallocate
their savings to country j. Again, total tax revenues remain zero, and the country is
indiﬀerent. Finally, any combined increase in residence and source taxes has the same
eﬀect.




j}, with at least
one tax rate being strictly positive, we will show that then there always exists a prof-







j, which implies that all savings are invested in the
country where the investor resides. The tax inequalities imply that −tr
i ≥ tr
j, which can
only be fulﬁlled if tr
i = tr
j = 0. This implies that ts
i = ts
j in order to make it rational
for the individuals to invest at home. A marginal reduction of the source tax by, say,
country i then has the following eﬀects on its welfare. (i) The relative price of sav-
ings with respect to consumption and labor supply changes, which induces behavioral
changes by the individuals, and thereby general-equilibrium eﬀects on the equilibrium
wage rate. These eﬀects have a direct eﬀect on utility as well as an indirect eﬀect on
utility via tax-base eﬀects. (ii) It becomes proﬁtable for foreigners to reallocate their
savings to country i, which increases country i’s tax revenues by ts
iRsj. The ﬁrst-order
eﬀect (ii) always over-compensates the second-order eﬀect (i), which implies that it is







j, which implies that all savings are invested in coun-
try i. Total tax revenues in country i and j are Ti = tw






and Tj = tw
j wjlj. There always exists a proﬁtable deviation for country j as long as at
least one tax rate is positive in country i: it can reduce either ts
j, or tr
j, or both, until
either the savings of foreigners or residents are reallocated to country j. This creates a
positive tax-base eﬀect because of the assumption that at least one tax rate is positive
creation of an equilibrium selection problem, and the coordination of expectations becomes crucial
for the success of eﬃcient punishment strategies.
19in country i, which implies that the reallocation occurs at a positive country-j tax rate.
If all tax rates are equal to zero in country i, country j can induce a reallocation of
savings sj, but the tax revenues remain zero. Hence, country j is indiﬀerent between
the positive tax rate and the tax rate that is equal to zero. Tax rates equal to zero, how-
ever, imply that country i is restricted to use the wage tax. A positive tax in country j
creates some leeway for the tax authority in country i to increase either the residence or
the source tax by a small but positive amount. We know from Result 1 and Corollary 1,
however, that eﬃciency requires the use of both, wage and capital taxes, which implies







j, which implies that all savings are invested in country j.







j, which implies that all savings are invested in the for-




and Tj = tw
j wjlj + ts
jRs
j
i. Two cases have to be considered:
(i) i-residents invest in country j because the residence-tax rate tr
i is suﬃciently large
(so that a reduction would imply a reallocation of savings). If the source tax in coun-
try j is strictly positive (ts
j > 0), a reduction of tr
i is always proﬁtable because it creates
a positive tax-base eﬀect by inducing a reallocation of savings. At ts
j = 0 country i is in-
diﬀerent because a reallocation of savings requires a reduction of the residence tax such
that additional tax revenues are equal to zero. In this case, for a reallocation to occur it
must be that ts
j = ts
i. This scenario has already been analyzed in Case 2 where we have
shown that a proﬁtable deviation exists. (ii) i-residents invest in country j even though
the residence tax is zero, tr
i = 0. In this case, however, it must be that j-residents invest
in country i because of a suﬃciently large residence tax tr
j. This situation is analogous
to case (i) analyzed above. q.e.d.
Proof of Result 3




i > 0. Since residents of country i cannot
avoid the residence tax, all savings are invested in the country where the investor
resides, si = si
i, and sj = s
j
j. Given that ts
i = 0, there exists no proﬁtable deviation for
country j. If country j increases its residence- or source-tax rate, their residents will
reallocate their savings to country i. Hence, total tax revenues remain zero, and the
country is indiﬀerent. For country i a change is tr
i has no eﬀect on the allocation of
savings across countries but on the savings decision of residents because of a change in
relative prices. Hence, the tax authority maximizes its objective function as if it were
20in a closed economy. Therefore, the optimal tax structure is implicitly given by (4) if
ts
i = 0. A change in ts
i, on the other hand, would induce a reallocation of savings to the
foreign country without any consequences for the residents. Hence, tax revenues and
utility remain unchanged.




j}, with at least
one tax rate in addition to the residence tax in country i being strictly positive. We
will show that then there always exists a proﬁtable deviation for at least one country.
We have to consider four possible cases again (the residence tax of country i does not






j, all savings are invested in the residence country. The tax





j = 0. This condition can only be fulﬁlled
if ts
i = ts
j in order to make it rational for the individuals to invest at home. It follows






j, all savings are invested in country i, and the revenues from
capital taxes are zero in country j. Two cases have to be distinguished. (i) If ts
i > 0






point the country obtains a discrete increase in tax revenues, (ts
j +tr
j)Rsj, without any
additional behavioral changes by the individuals. (ii) If ts
i = 0 only a decrease in ts
j +tr
j
to zero would induce a reallocation of savings. However, this would not change total
tax revenues. In this case, however, country i has an incentive to reduce its source-tax
rate ts
i. In order to control for behavioral changes of their residents, it is always possible
to reduce ts
i such that ts
i + tr
i remains constant. Moreover, the increase in the source
tax rate creates additional tax revenues because of an extension of the tax base to all













j, all savings are invested in the foreign country. Both
inequalities are only compatible if tr
j > 0. In this case total tax revenues in country i









i. Note that the positive
residence tax in country j creates no tax revenues but acts as a barrier for the inﬂow of
savings. Hence, there exists a tr
j ≥ 0 such that savings of j residents are reallocated to
country j. Assume that tr
j is chosen such that j-residents face the same net-interest rate
at home and abroad (which implies that they will invest at home by Lemma 1). Such





j. This is strictly positive because at least of the tax rates is strictly positive
21in order to fulﬁll the assumptions of Case 4.
Given that country i is restricted to the use of the residence-based capital income and
wage taxation it will maximize welfare according to (4). Given that country j can only
use the wage tax in equilibrium it will maximize welfare by choosing the wage tax
according to (5). q.e.d.
Proof of Result 6
As before we have to check whether all four possible allocations of savings among





j, all savings are invested in the residence country of the investor.
Hence, tax revenues from the withholding tax are equal to zero. Assume that tr
i > 0.
In this case country j may choose a tax rate 0 < ts
j < tr
i such that i-residents reallocate
their savings. This creates an increase in tax revenues of ts
jRsi > 0. If tr
i = 0 such a
strategy is impossible. On the other hand, if ts
i > 0 it is impossible to gain for country
j by lowering tr
j because the relevant tax base – savings of residents – is already subject
to residence taxation or the residence tax is equal to zero. Hence, tr
i = tr
j = 0 and
ts
i,ts





j, all savings are invested in country i, and the revenues from
capital taxes are zero in country j. As before, country j can always gain by suﬃciently
lowering ts
j if tr
i > 0 or tr
j if ts
i > 0. If tr
i = ts
i = 0, country j is indiﬀerent between all
capital-tax rates. However, tr
j = 0 is incompatible with the assumption that all savings











j, all savings are invested in the foreign country. This case is
symmetric to Case 1: if ts
i > 0, country j has always an incentive to set 0 < tr
j ≤ ts
i in
order to attract savings of residents. This creates a positive eﬀect for tax revenues. If
ts
i = 0, however, country j has no incentive to attract this savings because the eﬀect
on tax revenues is zero. Hence, only ts
i = ts
j = 0 do not induce any incentive to deviate.
Every positive residence-tax rate, however, is compatible with an equilibrium. Given
that the countries can only generate revenues by the use of the wage tax they will
maximize welfare by choosing it according to (5). q.e.d.
Proof of Result 7
Again we have to check whether the possible allocations of savings can be supported




j, all savings are invested in the residence country. If tr
j > 0 there
exists a tax rate 0 < ts
i < tr
j such that j-residents reallocate their savings. This creates
an increase in tax revenues of ts
isj > 0. Hence, ts
j = 0 in equilibrium. The choice of tr
i is
irrelevant for the allocation of savings among countries because it cannot be avoided.
Given that all savings are invested in the residence country, also ts
i and ts
j are irrelevant
and can therefore be set arbitrarily.
Case 2: ts
j ≥ 0 ∧ ts
i < tr
j, all savings are invested in country i. If ts
i > 0, country j
can always raise its tax revenues by setting tr
j = ts
i and thereby attracting sj. hence,
ts
i = 0 in equilibrium. If tr
j > 0, on the other hand, country i will always increase its
tax revenues by setting ts
i = tr
j −,  > 0, → 0 because the tax burden falls completely
on the residents of the foreign country. An increase in the tax burden of country-j
residents, however, reduces welfare in country j. this loss of welfare can be avoided by
setting tr
j = 0. If tr
j = ts
i = 0, ts
j is irrelevant.
Cases 3 and 4: Both cases would imply ts
j < 0, which can be excluded from our as-
sumption that taxes are in the interval [0,1].
In summary, country i can only generate tax revenues by the use of the wage and the
residence tax, whereas country j can only raise tax revenues by the use of the wage
tax. Hence, the optimal tax rates are deﬁned by (4) and (5) respectively. q.e.d.
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